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Abstract This article examines the potential risks on consumption behavior of lump-
sum payments. As a pension, lump-sum payments could be consumed too fast and
generate an increase of poverty rates. We experimentally investigate consumption
behavior in an inter-temporal decision-making setting. Subjects make consumption
and saving decisions in an environment with two central features: first, there exists a
decreasing probability of survival; and second, in addition to the regular income they
get while active, they receive a unique lump-sum payment when retired. The results
of this experiment show that rather than consuming too much during their income
periods, subjects show a persistent precautionary saving behavior and over-save in
the vast majority of periods. This result seems to be mainly driven by the risk averse
individuals.
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1 Introduction
The reform of Social Security systems is now one of the main issues on the economic
policy agenda of most industrialized countries. It is widely considered that, unless
serious changes take place, the aging of the population implying a rise in the number
of retirees relative to that of workers will threaten the viability of Pay-As-You-Go
public pension systems in the long-run. With the aim of eliminating these future
financing problems, one of the main goals of pension reforms is to raise the average
age of retirement of workers
Orszag (2001), related to U.S. Social Security, considered that transforming Social
Security’s delayed retirement credit (given to people working between the ages of 62
and 65 in the U.S.) into a lump-sum payment rather than an increased monthly payment
would likely encourage people to defer retirement. This question is addressed in Fatas
et al. (2007). They find that the more concentrated the payments (shifting from annuity
into lump-sum), the more postponed the retirement decisions.
Besides, it is likely that this transformation including a lump-sum payment would
be relatively easy to implement. In the U.S. private industry, whose retirement benefits
may be distributed in several alternative ways, using some type of lump-sum benefit
as a payment option has become popular as an alternative to annuity payments (see
Moore and Muller 2002; Blostin 2003 or Butrica et al. 2006).1 The Financial Times
reported in July 2011 that 79 % of polled pensioners collecting a company or private
pension that year took a lump sum at their retirement.
However, although this type of proposal is outside of the current public pensions
debate, the incorporation of a lump-sum payment as a measure to delay retirement
decisions should require further analysis before receiving full consideration by poli-
cymakers.
Little is known about how quickly retirees would spend down their lump-sum pay-
ments, or how these reforms would affect consumption patterns. Butrica et al. (2006),
using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), examine how household
expenditures among adults aged 65 and older vary by the degree of annuitization. They
find that if Social Security was completely privatized, and retirees did not annuitize,
discretionary spending could increase by as much as 22 percent for married adults and
38 percent for unmarried adults. However, other studies have shown that consumption
usually declines at retirement. This decline has increasingly been referred to as the
retirement consumption puzzle. See Fisher et al. (2005) for references.
1 Additionally, Fetherstonhaugh and Lee Ross (1999), using a questionnaire, find evidence that people
would be more willing to delay retirement if they received a lump-sum payment rather than an increased
annuity.
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These opposite results suggest that more research is needed before unambiguous
conclusions can be made. This is precisely the aim of this work: to provide additional
empirical evidence to this debate. To this end, we consider an experimental investiga-
tion to test the potential effects on consumption behavior of implementing a lump-sum
payment in a public pension system. We also analyze how closely the predictions of
the optimality theory fit the actual behavior of subjects in a lab.
Over the last two decades, there has been a steady increase in the applications of
laboratory methods on economic questions. As Falk and Fehr (2003) state, one of
the strengths of experimental methods is that we can empirically study the effects
of different institutional environments, as defined by their rules and incentives. The
precise observation of human behavior in experiments also forces the researcher to
take issues of human motivation and bounded rationality more seriously. In the long
run, this is likely to generate a more realistic picture of human nature. In this sense,
lab experiments should not be viewed as substitutes but as complements to more
traditional methods of empirical economic analysis.
Our paper contributes to the experimental literature dealing with saving-consump-
tion behavior (Camerer and Chua 2005; Carbone and Hey 2004; Ballinger et al. 2004;
Brown et al. 2006). To our knowledge, this is the first experimental approach to examine
a dynamic saving-consumption problem in a retirement framework.2 In this sense,
this paper also contributes to the literature on retirement behavior and pension plans
(Breyer and Kifmann 2002; Fehr et al. 2003; Fatas et al. 2007; among others).
The experimental design is based on two central features: first, there exists a decreas-
ing probability of surviving which implies an uncertain future income; and, secondly,
there are two sequences of income, one when individual works and another when
she is retired. While working, subjects earn a constant wage and at the beginning of
their retirement period they receive the present value of the total pension benefits as a
unique lump-sum payment.
The results of this paper indicate that in the vast majority of periods subjects over-
save rather than over-consume. This result holds for both the periods prior to the
lump-sum payment and the no income periods, when smoothing becomes more diffi-
cult. We also find that subjects over-react to the lump-sum payments, as they briefly
consume above their optimal dynamic consumption paths. However, and on aggregate,
the general picture goes in the opposite direction. Subjects, rather to consume their
available income immediately after the lump-sum period, keep on smoothing their
consumption and adjust it to the optimal path in a more than reasonable way.
An additional risk, pointed by Orszag (2001), would come from the political
pressure to extend lump-sum payments to those who are younger than the regular
retirement age. Such an extension would raise the risk of increasing elderly poverty
rates. In order to study the consequences of such a possibility, we ran a second treat-
ment moving the lump-sum payment into earlier periods (increasing the number of
2 In a retirement and experimental benchmark, Agnew et al. (2008) designed an experiment to examine
the role of gender in the choice between purchasing an annuity or investing their savings on their own.
Gazzale and Walker (2009) also conducted a lab experiment to systematically investigate the low rate of
retirement-asset annuitization relative to the predictions of standard models. However, none of these papers
consider saving-consumption decisions.
123
396 SERIEs (2013) 4:393–413
periods with no income at all). It also has to be noted that we consider actuarially
fair pension systems and therefore in this second treatment the lump-sum payment is
also smaller. Data show that subjects tend to over-react even more and adopt stronger
precautionary saving measures in this second treatment. The result of over-saving
behavior seems to be mainly driven by the risk averse individuals. Additionally, in
order to identify the determinants of the consumption behavior, we run some regres-
sions. One of our findings that could explain the over-saving behavior is that sub-
jects do not consider their available cash when dealing with consumption decisions.
Thus, our results suggest that Social Security reforms aimed at moving from tradi-
tional annuitized pensions to lump-sum payments might not yield increases in poverty
rates.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the experimental
literature on this topic. Section 3 develops the theoretical model, while Sect. 4 presents
the experimental design and procedures. Section 5 presents our results and Sect. 6
concludes. All tables and figures are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Experimental background
In the experimental literature into consumption behavior under uncertainty there exist
few contributions but relevant ones. For instance, Hey and Dardadoni (1988) describe
a large-scale experimental investigation to test the implications of expected utility
maximization on optimal consumption behavior. They find that the actual behavior
in the lab differs significantly from the optimal behavior, and that the comparative
static implications of actual behavior agree with those of optimality theory. Carbone
and Hey (2004) investigate the over-sensitivity of consumption to current income.
They adopt a simple model in which income in any period can take just one of two
values: employment and unemployment. Unlike neoclassical theoretical predictions
about smooth consumption over time, they find that subjects over-react. That is, their
results show a close relationship between consumption and current income.
On the other hand, Ballinger et al. (2004) study social learning about the life cycle
saving task. They use experimental methods to study a household inter-temporal choice
problem. Subjects participate in three-member “families”. Second and third “gener-
ation” subjects observe and/or communicate with their “antecedent” first or second
generation subject. They find that later generations perform significantly better than
earlier generations. Brown et al. (2006) establish potential ways in which consumers
can attain near-optimal consumption behavior. In line with Ballinger et al. (2004),
individual and social learning mechanisms are proposed to be one possible link. They
find that while consumers persistently spend too much in early periods, they learn
rapidly from their own experience and from experience of others to consume amounts
close to optimal levels.
Our work presents some interesting differences with regard to all above mentioned
papers. In order to investigate saving-consumption decisions in a retirement bench-
mark, we introduce two novel features. First, subjects face a decreasing probability of
surviving across periods. Second, participants receive three different levels of income
according to a retirement period (R hereafter): (i) a constant level of income during
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each period before R (as worker); (ii) a higher lump-sum of income in R (the first
period as retired); and (iii) nothing from R on.
3 The model
Before we proceed with the experimental design and results, in this section we are going
to characterize the optimal consumption decisions using a standard model. Consider
an individual who has to decide on his optimum consumption at different age in
presence of uncertainty about the length of life. Suppose that this is the only uncertainty
that the individual faces. Let T > 0 be the planning horizon, that is, maximum
lifetime. Lifetime uncertainty is presented by a survival distribution function, F(t)
non increasing in age, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , that satisfies F(0) = 1.3 All individuals are
assumed to have the same survival distribution function.4
Denote consumption at age t by c(t), where c(t) ≥ 0. Utility from consumption
at different ages is separable and independent of age. There is no subjective discount
rate.5 We use a specific utility function, u(c) that displays risk-aversion, and to ensure
an interior solution, satisfies the Inada conditions.6 While working, the individual pro-
vides one unit of labor. Contingent on survival, the individual works between ages 0
and R, 0 < R < T , that is, there exists a mandatory retirement age that occurs at R. The





Let wages at age t, be w(t) ≥ 0. Savings earn a zero rate of interest.7 With no
initial assets, the individual’s assets at age t, S(t), are equal to the cumulative savings.








We assume that w(t) = w for all 0 < t < R, therefore the restriction becomes




3 In a theoretical background it also requires that F(T)=0.
4 See third column in Table 1.
5 For the sake of simplicity we choose a zero discount rate.
6 Conditions for risk aversion are u′(c) > 0 and u′′(c) < 0. The Inada conditions imply that u′(0)=8 and
u′(8)=0. The specific utility function for implementing the experiment is u(c)=10 * square root (c).
7 For the sake of simplicity we choose a zero discount rate.
123
398 SERIEs (2013) 4:393–413
The choice of the optimum consumption path will depend on the insurance options
available. Relative to this benchmark case, we analyze an alternative scenario, in which
individuals will receive a unique lump-sum payment at the beginning of the retirement




F(t)τw = F(R)LS, (4)
then the lump-sum payment is





Restriction on savings is now
S(t) = min [L S, t (1 − τ)w] −
t∑
j=1
c( j) ∀t ∈ [1, R]. (6)
This theoretical model will be used to measure to which extent subjects deviate
form the optimal consumption path in the experiment.
4 Experimental design and procedures
Our experimental design tries to capture some actual features of an actuarially fair
public pension system with a unique lump-sum payment.8 The experiment consists
of three sequences of at most 30 rounds and one decision per round. See Table 1 into
Appendix.
Each round is characterized by a probability of surviving. As the round number
increases, the probability of surviving decreases. In each round reached, subject either
survives or not. A subject reaches a round if, and only if, she has survived all earlier
rounds.
During the first R − 1 rounds, similar to wage earnings, subject receives 85 exper-
imental units in each reached round (Income).
In round R, subjects receive the present value of the total pension benefits as a
unique lump-sum payment. As abovementioned, as a strategy to analyze what would
happen with savings and spending decisions if lump-sum payments where extended
to those who retire earlier than the regular retirement age, we design two treatments.
In Treatment 1 (hereafter LS10) the round R is the 10th and in Treatment 2 (hereafter
LS15) the round R is the 15th.
8 Reforms aiming to achieve actuarially fair social security systems must adjust pension benefits to achieve
that the increase in pension benefits be exactly offset by the higher cost in terms of contributions and
foregone pensions.
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We consider a gross wage of 100 experimental units and a tax rate of 15 %. Thus,
in order to reflect an actuarially fair pension system, the lump-sum payment in LS10
is equal to 191.25 experimental units (with R=10) and in LS15 is equal to 345
experimental units (with R=15) following Eq. (5).
In the remaining rounds subjects receive no income at all. Therefore, in LS10 and
in LS15 subjects have at most 19 and 14 rounds with no income, respectively.
In each round subjects have to make a unique decision about how to divide the
Available Cash into consumption and savings. The available cash comes from the
addition of the income received in that period and what is not consumed in previous
rounds (their cumulative savings). So, income can be saved to provide wealth but
savings earn no interest. Additionally, borrowing is not allowed, that is, subjects cannot
spend more than their Available Cash.
Let C denote the amount of experimental units converted into points by subjects in
each round (their consumption). Subjects are informed of the conversion scale (from
experimental units to points, converted into real euros at the end of the experiment): C
experimental units generate 20 * square root (C) points. A table mapping how different
consumption choices are converted into points is given separately to subjects.
As mentioned above, subjects play three sequences. They are told that at the end of
the experiment they will be privately paid in cash the total amount of points converted
from experimental units of one of the three sequences (randomly chosen). They are
also told that any unconverted experimental unit remaining at the end of any sequence
is worthless.
A total of 39 undergraduate students in Business and Economics from the University
of Valencia took part in the experiment. All sessions were run at the Laboratory for
Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX) and standard electronic recruitment
procedures were used to collect the subject pool. All subjects participating in the
experiment had previously participated (weeks before the experiment was run) in
other sessions facing a Raven test, a risk aversion test and a basic socioeconomic
survey.9 The list of participants in every session was randomized to control for any
reputation or group identity effect. Anonymity was preserved using random codes and
these tests were paid independently.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects entered the laboratory and were ran-
domly seated in a private cubicle. Experimental instructions were read aloud by the
experimenter.10 To make sure subjects understood the logic of the game, subjects
completed a quiz before the experiment began. Explanations were repeated until all
subjects passed the quiz (nobody made a mistake almost from the beginning, quiz
available from authors upon request).
9 The electronic recruitment system at LINEEX follows a quite natural mechanism. The University of
Valencia students get an email from the laboratory, announcing new sessions. They then go to a web based
system to register in a given session, depending on their prior experience and the session requirements. The
risk aversion test was the one by Holt and Laury (2002), based on a menu of ten paired lottery choices.
Decisions in our experiment were matched with the decisions in the test by a common random code subjects
used in both sessions. Identities were never linked to choices.
10 Instructions are available upon request from the authors.
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At the end of the experiment subjects were privately paid with an exchange rate
of 125 points = e1 for one of the three sequences, chosen at random. On average an
experimental session lasted <90 min, the average earnings were around e27 and the
maximum earnings peaked above e40.
The experiment consisted of two treatments: LS10 and LS15. 20 subjects partici-
pated at LS10 and 19 subjects at LS15.
5 Results
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the individuals’ decisions about consump-
tion, their cumulative savings and available cash at the beginning of each period, for
both the LS10 and LS15 treatments, by sequences. The number of survived periods in
the last row denotes the average number of rounds that subjects were alive and making
decisions. Average life is almost identical in both treatments (16.7 versus 16.58, as
expected in a pure randomly driven process).
By pure inspection, average consumption is higher in LS15 than in LS10. This
follows the experimental design, as subjects get a higher lump-sum and get a positive
income during a higher number of periods in LS15. However, the more interesting
information regarding treatment effects comes from the next two variables. Both the
average cumulative savings and the available cash are a direct consequence of subjects’
decisions in both treatments. Again, by pure inspection, subjects save considerably
more in LS10 (152.8) than in LS15 (101.4): the difference is around 50 %. This suggests
that subjects in the worst scenario are able to save more to protect themselves from
the higher number of periods with no income. Moreover, the average available cash is
larger in LS10, in spite of the fact that available cash is the sum of cumulative savings
and income (by definition, larger in LS15 than in LS10). Over-saving behaviour in
LS10 more than compensates this difference.
No clear differences are observed across sequences within each treatment in con-
sumption and savings. The actual consumption and saving choices do not show a clear
(increasing or decreasing) trend as participants play more sequences. However, the
standard deviation falls as subjects make more decisions. Besides, this reduction in
the standard deviation across sequences seems to be systematic for all available vari-
ables. That is, in a very preliminary way, subjects seem to adjust better as the number
of decisions increases.
The descriptive information shown above is not enough to answer our main research
question. In order to learn about subjects’ capabilities to get close to the optimal
consumption path, we need to measure the distance between actual decisions and our
theoretical benchmark.
We include two measures of divergence between actual and optimal behaviour. In
our view, there are two plausible ways of thinking about optimality in this context. The
first way is to define optimal consumption as the level of consumption calculated in the
first period for the rest of the life-time profile. We will call this optimal consumption
the ex-ante optimal consumption (EAOC). To compute EAOC we solve the dynamic
optimization problem in period zero to find the optimal smoothed consumption path.
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The policy consequences of this approach to optimal decisions are straightforward:
EAOC would be the rational choices done by a benevolent social planner.
The second approach to optimality takes as the natural analysis unit the per-round
individual decision. For every subject and every available cash amount, based on her
previous decisions, we compute the optimal consumption for every period, contingent
on the fact that (i) she is alive and (ii) owns a given actual positive wealth. This
alternative approach is a kind of natural basis for assessing the optimality of subjects’
decisions dynamically. We call this ex-post optimal consumption (EPOC).
Note that EAOC and EPOC have different meanings. The natural interpretation for
EAOC comes from the policy side: it is a general average measure of the adjustment
of the population (in our case, the subject pool) to the optimal path in welfare terms.
Significant deviations in this ex ante measure can be associated to welfare losses. EPOC
gives additional valuable information about the optimality of decisions at the individual
level. For every subject, in every period, it defines the optimal decision, contingent on
the fact that she is still making decisions over her individual level of wealth.
To facilitate the comparison of actual and optimal consumption levels over all
individuals we plot them. Figures 1 and 2 (3 and 4) correspond to average consumption
and cumulative savings in LS10 (LS15). In Figs. 1 and 3, the actual consumption paths
are compared with EAOC and EPOC, while the associated optimal cumulative savings
are used in Figs. 2 and 4.
In these comparisions a risk aversion rate of 0.50 is used. The reason is the fol-
lowing. A constant risk aversion rate of 0.50 is implicitly used in the payoff function
converting points into earnings.11
Unlike previous experimental papers, we find no evidence of over consumption
in the first rounds. On the contrary, our participants under-consume in this earliest
periods.12 This under-consumption behaviour lasts until round 5 in LS10 and round
10 in LS15 using the EAOC as a benchmark, while it holds in almost all rounds when
the EPAC measure is used.
From an ex ante perspective, and before the lump-sum period comes, consumption
exhibits some inertia and subjects fail to smooth it. Relative to the EAOC path, subjects
over consume temporarily around the lump-sum period, in rounds 8–11 in LS10 and
rounds 11–15 in LS15. However, this over consumption disappears when EPOC is
used as the reference point. With the exclusion of the very same period when the lump
sum is received, subjects under consume in all periods relative to the optimal path.
Interestingly, after the lump-sum payment period, when subjects get no income at
all, participants in the experiment performed relatively well adjusting their behaviour
to the optimal path. Rather to consume their available income immediately after the
lump-sum period, they keep on smoothing their consumption and adjust it to the
optimal path in a more than reasonable way.
11 As the conversion involves no uncertainty at all, this parameter is only a design artifact to generate a
concave payoff function and allow for some consumption smoothing. Similar design features have been
used in the related literature, described in Sect. 2.
12 We denote by earliest periods the pre lump-sum rounds, that is, the 10 first rounds in LS10 and the 15
first rounds in LS15.
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A natural way to back up these descriptive comments is to have a look at the
evolution of cumulative savings over time in Figs. 2 and 4. Subjects perform saving
choices in a relatively poor manner, in the sense that they over-save in all periods in
LS10. In LS15 subjects also over-save in a vast majority of periods, with the notable
exception of periods around the lump-sum payment, when their reaction to the sharp
increase in income is not compensated by a parallel jump in savings.13 This general
behavioural pattern does not change after receiving the lump-sum payment. It suggests
that savings tend to be precautionary, with the exception of the periods in which the
high lump-sum is received.
Before we proceed with a more formal analysis of the experimental data it is worth
to note that our design can be considered as a kind of a strong test for over-saving (and
under-consumption). On the one hand, in Hey and Dardadoni (1988) and Carbone and
Hey (2004) the rate of return per period is known and certain, for all money saved. On
the other, in Ballinger et al. (2004) and Brown et al. (2006) the incentives to save money
are embedded in their particular utility function, so saving is salient for subjects.
In our experimental design savings yields no returns. Our utility function, though
concave, differs of the ones used by Ballinger et al. (2004) and Brown et al. (2006) to
avoid the salience of saving money. Additionally, subjects were not punished in any
specific way when their consumption was critically low, as no negative utility was
associated to a zero consumption level. We additionally paid very much attention to
keep framing as neutral as possible to avoid any kind of demand effect.
In order to check whether our results are robust to changes in risk aversion rates,
we make a second analysis. We compare the actual and optimal consumption levels
for different risk aversion coefficients (risk averse, risk neutral and risk loving).14 See
Figs. 5, 6, 7 and 8. Our results show that the risk averse individuals mainly drive the
over-saving. Note that, as in the general case discussed above, the actual cumulative
saving before the lump-sum payment is higher than the optimal one under EAOC
and EPOC. For the case of risk neutral and risk loving individuals, the over-saving
no longer exists, except for the case of EPOC for risk neutral individuals in both
treatments (LS10 and LS15). Therefore, we can conclude that the existence of over-
saving is mostly due to the individual’s risk aversion.
In a more formal way, we run some regressions to explore the determinants of
decisions. To control for the dependency of the observations from a single subject we
use clustering to avoid that the t-values are extremely overestimated. The dependent
variable is the log of absolute deviation from optimality (both relative to EAOC and
EPOC: LD-EAOC and LD-EPOC considering each particular risk aversion value).
A negative coefficient means that the corresponding independent variable lowers the
deviation from optimality. Since the dependent variable is the logged deviation, the
coefficient means that a variable causes a certain percentage of increase or decrease
in deviation relative to when this variable is absent.
13 The optimal consumption peaks at the retirement period because of the lump-sum payment. This peak is
larger is LS15 due to the lump-sum payment is larger and the probability of surviving, when it is received,
is much lower.
14 We would like to thank to an anonymous referee for pointing out the importance of making such
comparisons.
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We consider different groups of explanatory variables. Dumbreak is a dummy that
takes the value of 1 for all LS10 data, 0 otherwise, and it intends to capture the existence
of any treatment effect. Seq2 (Seq 3) takes the value of 1 when data is generated in the
second (third) sequence of 30 rounds.
As the probability of survival decreases with the number of periods played,
we include both a Period and a Period Squared variable. Hand in hand with the
increasing uncertainty (measured by the decreasing probability of survival), we
expect participants to make worse decisions as the number of periods increases,
so we expect a positive coefficient for this variable. The Period Squared variable
simply takes into account any possible non-linearity that the period variable may
have.
Risk is the risk aversion of subjects, as measured by the Holt and Laury risk aversion
test. The original value range (from 0 to 10), is decomposed into three values: 0 if
subject is risk loving, 1 if she is risk neutral and 2 if she is risk averse. Raven Test
is the ratio of correct answers in the test (a non verbal IQ test) run by all subjects
participating in the experiment. Sex is a dummy variable to control for gender effects
(0 for females, 1 for males).15 We report the estimation results in Table 3.
The first result emerging from Table 3 is that timing matters when dealing with
lump sum schemes. Postponing the retirement period and getting the lump sum later,
significantly increases the deviation from the optimal path. Even when subjects get a
positive income fewer times in LS10, they are relatively better able to cope with the
optimization problem and smooth their consumption over time.
No sequence dummy is significant, so our results suggest that there is very little
learning across stages, if any. Coefficients on Period and Period Squared show that, as
expected, deviations increase as more periods are played, but at a decreasing rate. Risk
aversion is significant. Risk-averse subjects outperform risk lovers (as the negative
coefficients show).
Following Brown et al. (2006), we want to check a natural behavioural explanation
for the observed patterns of consumption based on either the existence of a “rule of
thumb” (subjects simply spend a fixed fraction of their current income or a fraction
of available cash) or that consumers spend a fraction of the conditionally optimal
amount. To investigate these alternative explanations, we ran regressions in which the
log of actual consumption is regressed against the optimal level of consumption and
either current income or available cash (i.e., income plus cumulative savings). Table 4
summarizes these results.16
Table 4 suggests that subjects do not consider their available cash when dealing
with consumption decisions. They mainly focus on their current income. Besides,
the coefficient of Income is larger than that of Available cash, which means that
subjects decide their consumption levels regardless of their savings. This is consistent
15 Additional socioeconomic variables are excluded from the analysis as they proved to be never significant
in all estimations. Full estimations are available from authors upon request.
16 Fixed effects are included to adjust for the possibility that some subjects saved more than others. The
estimates of those variables are omitted for the sake of simplicity. Although not in the table, we have also
performed the analysis by sequence for any of the treatments. Since the results do not change we only
present results by pooled data.
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with the over-saving behavioural pattern. The increment in the R-squared value is
small when considering Available cash but large in the case of Income. Notice that
this result is independent of ex-ante or ex-post considerations. However, unlike in the
EAOC framework, we find that the optimal consumption also explains the consumption
pattern in the EPOC framework.
6 Conclusions
More and more companies are giving the option of taking the pension as a lump
sum distribution instead of an annuity payout. However, retirees need to carefully
weigh out the pros and cons of a lump sum or annuity distribution before making
this decision. People who do not annuitize much of their retirement wealth might
spend too quickly the lump-sum payment reducing income at very old ages. In this
paper we have tested in the laboratory the potential effects on consumption behavior
of a lump-sum payment. Our main conclusion is that this might not be the case. The
introduction of a unique lump-sum payment generates a behavioral overreaction in
the opposite direction: rather than consuming too much, too fast, our subjects show a
persistent precautionary saving behavior. This result seems to be mainly driven by the
risk averse individuals, which are the most frequent type.
The picture that leaves our experiment is that transforming (at least, partially)
pension benefits into lump-sum payments might not increase elderly poverty rates.
Moreover, the earlier and the lower the lump-sum payment, the stronger the saving
reaction.
It is always difficult to translate results from a lab experiment to behavior in the real
world. Although the subjects of this experiment are both younger and more educated
on average than the individuals who would take decisions in real life, results obtained
are in line with some evidence on decision processes of real people in similar decisions.
For instance, Hamermesh and Menchik (1987), analyzing bequests and the planning
horizon and using a data set on wealthy decedents and their parents, state that there is
a high average level of savings, far above what could be explained solely by planned
saving for retirement. Thaler (1992) also finds that individuals are more likely to save
a larger amount as the size of the lump sum increases.
In this sense, this experiment is a small step on the experimental analysis of con-
sumption behavior by allowing us to illustrate the point obtained from a theoretical
model with rational expectation agents.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix
See Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
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1 1 1 85 85 85 – – –
2 29/30 29/30 85 85
3 28/29 28/30 85 85
4 27/28 27/30 85 85
5 26/27 26/30 85 85
6 25/26 25/30 85 85
7 24/25 24/30 85 85
8 23/24 23/30 85 85
9 22/23 22/30 85 85
10 21/22 21/30 85 85
11 20/21 20/30 191.25 85
12 19/20 19/30 85
13 18/19 18/30 85
14 17/18 17/30 85
15 16/17 16/30 85
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Averages LS10 LS15
Total Seq=1 Seq=2 Seq=3 Total Seq=1 Seq=2 Seq= 3
Consumption 43.82 49.32 40.27 43.74 66.22 65.89 68.11 65.11
(44.20) (50.51) (44.61) (36.62) (44.65) (50.35) (44.18) (40.47)
Cum. savings 152.8 148.0 149.6 161.4 101.4 111.8 89.4 102.5
(187.35) (198.69) (187.81) (176.36) (135.31) (144.99) (128.05) (132.75)
Available cash 196.6 197.3 189.9 205.2 167.6 177.7 157.5 167.6
(191.28) (197.28) (196.21) (179.00) (135.89) (144.09) (127.74) (135.25)
# Survived periods 16.70 13.75 20.90 15.45 16.58 14.79 14.63 20.31
(9.37) (9.10) (8.52) (8.96) (8.86) (9.52) (8.11) (7.63)
# Obs. 1,002 275 418 309 945 281 278 386
Standard errors in brackets
Table 3 Regression analysis
Standard errors in brackets
* Significant at 10 %;
** significant at 5 %;




Seq 1 −0.498 −0.400
(0.580) (0.559)




Period squared −0.013*** −0.014***
(0.003) (0.003)
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Table 4 Behavioral analysis
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10 %;
** significant at 5 %;
*** significant at 1 %
Consumption Exante Expost
Optimal consumption −0.009 −0.300 0.229** 0.524***
(0.234) (0.275) (0.087) (0.121)
Income 0.364*** 0.348***
(0.101) (0.102)
Available cash 0.001 0.002
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 1,361 1,361 1,361 1,361













































Fig. 2 Cumulative savings in treatment LS10
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Fig. 4 Cumulative savings in treatment LS15
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Fig. 5 Consumption in treatment LS10 (by risk aversion coefficients)
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Fig. 6 Cumulative savings in treatment LS10 (by risk aversion coefficients)
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Fig. 7 Consumption in treatment LS15 (by risk aversion coefficients)
123
412 SERIEs (2013) 4:393–413
Fig. 8 Cumulative savings in treatment LS15 (by risk aversion coefficients)
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